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by James Manor 
 
     Since the mid-1990s, it has become clear from research by anthropologists that the 
power of caste hierarchies in rural India has waned substantially.  Caste increasingly 
tends to denote ‘difference’ more than ‘hierarchy’.  This change has occurred unevenly 
across India, but enough evidence has emerged from different regions to indicate that it is 
a national trend.  It is arguably one of the two most important changes to occur in India 
since Independence, along with the consolidation of a socially rooted democracy.   
     Despite this, however, we know too little about the implications of this change.  We 
need to consider its implications both within local arenas in rural areas, and at higher 
levels.  Does it open the way to the emergence of new forms of dominance at the 
grassroots, to more accommodative or more brutish power relations within rural society?  
Why has it brought in its wake rising levels of violence in some places but not in others?  
As this change undermines the power within local arenas of once-dominant castes, has it 
also made it impossible for people there to get things done on their own through 
collective action – so that they turn increasingly to higher levels of government for 
assistance?   
     Since rural dwellers still decide election outcomes, how has the decline in caste 
hierarchies impinged upon the democratic process, at higher levels?  What opportunities 
and dangers attend it?  Is it liberating, or does it produce social dislocation which inspires 
alienation and destructive tension?  Does it facilitate or impede social movements from 
below, and (from above) the construction of social coalitions by political parties at 
national and especially state levels?  How has it affected programmes and efforts to 
promote development and social justice?  Might it hold promise for parties of the left or 
of the Hindu nationalist right – or for centrist parties?   
     The rest of this note is a tentative, somewhat crude attempt to summarise what we 
now know -- or suspect – and to raise questions for discussion at the Shimla conference.  
The comments that follow should be treated as hypotheses more than as established fact.  
Everything here is open for debate, which is very welcome.  
1. The once formidable hierarchical structures associated with caste have 
substantially broken down in much of rural India.  Most people within the 
majority of the rural population who were dominated under the old order no 
longer accept the claims to superiority (or comply with the wishes) of groups 
which long enjoyed high caste status.  As a result, in much of rural India the 
classic pattern in which a ‘dominant caste’ exercised inordinate social and 
political influence over village life has collapsed. 
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2. This does not imply, however, that caste as a social institution has wasted away.  
People still tend overwhelmingly to marry their children to other members of their 
endogamous caste group (that is, their jati).  They also still tend – quite often, but 
to a lesser degree -- to undertake collective action in concert with other members 
of their jati.  (So caste possesses materiality, and is not just a trick of the mind.)   
But when castes interact, they do so on a more equal footing than before.  
Endogamy remains formidable despite the decline of hierarchy, and it powerfully 
shapes social interactions. 
 
3. The decline of hierarchy and thus of caste-based dominance does not always 
imply, however, that dominance has disappeared.  In many areas, there are still 
dominant groups, but they tend to come from diverse caste backgrounds, and their 
dominance derives less from caste status than from other things.  These include 
economic power, numerical strength, access to and the control over information, 
connections to powerful politicians and bureaucrats beyond the locality, patron-
client networks, and the threat and/or the use of coercion and violence.  In much 
of India, dominance has not vanished with caste hierarchy, but has been 
reconstituted by other means. 
 
4. However, in some other rural arenas, no group can wield sufficient power to 
dominate.  But formerly dominant groups still seek to operate in ways associated 
with the old patterns.  They often bitterly resent refusals by other groups to defer 
to them and to comply with their wishes.  The ensuing tensions have sometimes 
triggered rising levels of violence – even in some of the traditionally more 
peaceable areas of India. 
 
5. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that inter-caste violence has increased most in 
such areas – places where greater economic development has occurred, where 
economic inequalities have long been less extreme, and where (partly as a result) 
the old caste hierarchies were less oppressive.  This appeared to be true of 
southern Karnataka.1   Field investigations in rural areas near Mysore City in 
February 2011 indicated that there, the problem of inter-caste violence and 
tension had been overstated in press reports.  On the other hand, reliable 
informants argued convincingly that tension (though not much violence) had 
increased in nearby Mandya District.  In Mandya, Vokkaligas (the traditionally 
dominant caste there) make up roughly half of the population, giving them greater 
numerical strength than is enjoyed by any caste group in any other district of the 
state.  That, and the habits of mind which developed as a result, have caused 
Vokkaligas in Mandya to seek to interact with other groups in the same, 
unyielding ways that have long prevailed – which has generated greater tensions. 
 
                                                 
1   Note the occurrence of serious inter-caste violence in southern Karnataka.  The old and less oppressive 
caste hierarchies there are analysed in J. Manor: “Karnataka: Caste, Class Dominance and Politics in a 
Cohesive Society”, in F. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds.) Dominance and State Power in India; Decline of a 
Social Order, volume one (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989). 
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6. Mandya, however, appears to be unusual.  When tensions and conflicts have 
indeed increased in most areas where the old socio-economic order was less 
oppressive (such as southern Karnataka where the incidence of landlessness was 
extremely low), two things appear to have happened.  First, as caste-based 
dominance has become impossible to sustain and the formerly dominant local 
elites have been unable to establish new forms of dominance by other means, they 
chafe bitterly against this.  Second, since the old caste hierarchies in these areas 
were less oppressive, traditionally lower-status groups are more willing and able 
to mount challenges to those elites than are their counterparts in more inequitable 
regions. 
 
7. One important influence on inter-caste relations within any given area comes 
from the availability – or non-availability – of ‘exits’, or opportunities for spatial 
mobility.  Surinder Jodhka’s studies of Punjab indicate that tensions and conflict 
tend to be more marked in areas where prosperous and/or disadvantaged groups 
lack ‘exits’ -- opportunities to move to other areas to escape social conditions 
which they dislike -- than in areas where such mobility is possible.  This theme 
has importance in Nanjangud District, near Mysore City, where Dalits and other 
disadvantaged groups were making good use of ‘exits’ – by commuting by train 
to the City to work as day labourers, while still residing in their villages.  The 
theme also has great importance in Telangana and coastal Andhra (two of the 
three sub-regions of Andhra Pradesh) where once dominant landed castes are 
reliably said to be ‘obsessed’ with exiting to the US and Australia.  A huge 
number of families from those castes have placed relatives overseas – partly 
because the standard of living there is higher, and partly because they are 
frustrated by ‘Naxalite’ activity and the decline in deference from low status 
groups.2  ‘Exits’ appear to be used less often in Rayalaseema (the third sub-
region), where inter-caste tensions appear to be more acute, partly as a result. 
 
8. There is also evidence, however, that in many localities -- in under-developed and 
more developed regions, and in more and less inequitable regions -- inter-caste 
violence has not increased.  New, more accommodative power relations – or at 
least grudging, uneasy local and regional political ‘settlements’ have emerged in 
which no group dominates.  This appears to happen in part because competition 
between different members of elites has compelled them to reach out to less 
prosperous groups for support (and for votes in local and higher-level elections).  
The composition of local and regional elites has become more heterogeneous in 
caste terms.  The end of dominance has often been reluctantly accepted by 
formerly dominant groups in such areas partly because those settlements still 
leave them with disproportionate influence. 
 
9. The decline in the power of caste hierarchy has made it difficult and often 
impossible for villages, as collectivities, to get certain important things done on 
their own.  When caste hierarchies were more widely accepted, leading figures in 
                                                 
2   I am grateful to Anil Kumar at ISEC for these insights. 
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the locally dominant caste enjoyed enough influence and deference to persuade or 
force most villagers to join in collective actions (sometimes attended by religious 
ceremonies) to bring in the harvest, repair local facilities, implement local 
projects. etc.  The waning of hierarchy has often made this impossible, so 
villagers must find new ways to “get things done”.3   
 
10. Two new options have emerged over the last two decades as a result of changes in 
the political system.  First, the election and empowerment of elected gram 
panchayats at or near the village level was mandated by the 73rd constitutional 
amendment in 1993.  Some state governments in India’s federal system have been 
generous in devolving powers and funds to panchayats, but most have not.  
Where they are strong, panchayats often make it possible for villages to “get 
things done” through democratic processes in which elites are often very 
influential but not necessarily dominant -- since they must share power with 
elected councillors from other groups and attract votes from those groups.4  But 
the limited funds and powers which such councils possess in much of India 
severely limits the utility of this option.5                 
 
11. A second more widely available option has been provided by a remarkable 
proliferation over the last 20 years (and especially over the last seven) of 
government programmes to promote development and to tackle poverty.  
Accessing resources and technical assistance from these programmes, in order to 
“get things done”, requires villagers to reach upward to politicians and 
bureaucrats at sub-district and district levels.  This has knit villages more tightly 
into the political system, and arguably enabled democratic politics to penetrate 
more effectively downward into local arenas.  The need to reach upward has 
triggered another sort of proliferation – of village level political entrepreneurs or 
‘fixers’ who travel to sub-district and district headquarters to appeal to politicians 
and bureaucrats for help.6  When they prove to be effective at this, these ‘fixers’ 
often become leaders within their villages.  Since a significant proportion of them 
come from castes other than those which were formerly dominant, this further 
erodes the influence of old village elites.  That inspires resentment among the 
erstwhile elites, but it also tends to make local politics more open and democratic, 
and it helps to ensure that anti-poverty programmes actually reach the poor.        
 
                                                 
3   This phrase looms large in a particularly vivid demonstration of these changes: G.K. Karanth et al., 
chapters 11-14 on Baumgartner and R. Hogger (eds.) In Search of Sustainable Livelihood Systems: 
Managing Resources and Change (Sage Publications, London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, 2004). 
4   See for example, chapter two of R. Crook and J. Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia 
and West Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
5   J. Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (World Bank, Washington, 1999); and 
J. Manor, “Democratic Decentralisation in Two Indian States: Past and Present” Indian Jounral of Political 
Science (March 2002) pp. 51-72. 
6   See A. Krishna, Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Democracy and Development (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2002); and J. Manor, “’Towel over Armpit’: Small-time Political Fixers in 
India’s States” in A. Varshney (ed.) India and the Politics of Developing Countries: Essays in Honour of 
Myron Weiner (Sage Publications, London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, 2004) pp. 60-86. 
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12. Evidence from north-central and south India points to one important trend which 
has been examined in a comparative study of Uganda, Brazil and Madhya 
Pradesh.7  It found that democratic processes at the local level can persuade 
contending interests – including competing elites drawn both from formerly 
dominant and from formerly dominated groups – that ‘politics’ need not be a 
zero-sum game, and that political accommodations in which no winner takes all 
and no one achieves dominance are worth accepting.  When this anodyne-
sounding idea takes root, it sometimes reduces the risk of inter-caste violence 
 
13. The increased violence which in some areas has resulted from waning caste 
dominance appears, for the most part, not to have contributed much to the violent 
resistance to government authority in the ‘Naxalite’ belt.  On present evidence, 
the most of the areas in which such resistance arises are those occupied by 
adivasis, most of whom stand at one remove from the caste system and reside in 
entirely (or almost entirely) adivasi villages where no ‘dominant caste’ ever held 
sway.          
 
14. How does the decline of hierarchy affect higher level politics: voting behaviour 
by different castes; the efforts of political parties to cultivate support from castes, 
to forge alliances or sow divisions between castes; and the influence of leaders 
from various castes at higher levels?  Has the change made it easier or more 
difficult to arrange political accommodations between castes at higher levels?  
Has Indian democracy become more genuine but also less stable and manageable 
as a result of the change?  As hierarchies wane, do appeals to caste identities 
become more or less effective?  Does the change create opportunities for those 
who seek to mobilize people along class, religious or sub-regional lines?   
 
15. Have waning hierarchies affected the strong tendency of Indians to shift their 
preoccupations from one of the many identities available to them to others – often 
and with great fluidity?  (This tendency has usually prevented tension from 
developing along a single fault line in society.) 
 
16. Some studies suggest that the decline in the power of caste hierarchies has made 
India an even more genuine democracy by providing severely disadvantaged 
castes with greater opportunities and capacities -- and greater leverage in the 
political system.  Others call this into question, or stress that the main 
beneficiaries are found in the middle strata of the old hierarchies.  
 
17. Caste hierarchies have changed, but has ‘class’ – or perhaps to put it more 
helpfully, have ‘socio-economic relations/conditions’ -- changed?  Clearly the 
latter have changed, but we need to consider how and how much, in different 
regions – and how this connects to the declining power of caste hierarchies.  
Those hierarchies’ loss of power may have ‘caused’ certain changes in socio-
                                                 
7   M. Melo, N. Ng’ethe and J. Manor, Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against 
Poverty (Hurst/Columbia University Press, London/NewYork, forthcoming). 
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economic relations, and even if that is not true, they will have coloured those 
relations.  Socio-economic changes have also demonstrably played some role in 
causing the power of caste hierarchies to decline.  (In my last discussions with 
M.N. Srinivas, he took this view – he had a decidedly materialist explanation, 
seeing the disintegration of the old jajmani system as more crucial than, say, 
democratic politics or even the spread of education.)  But does the decline in caste 
hierarchies make ‘class’ more important – within villages, or across regions?  
Does it create opportunities for political parties that stress class issues?  (It does 
not yet appear to do so, as far as I can see.  I don’t see how it helps Hindu 
nationalists either.)  Or does it make ‘class’ a much more complex, ambiguous 
topic – and a more confusing (and thus less compelling) reality in rural areas?  
We need to remember that economic inequality has grown along with gross 
domestic product since the mid-1990s.  But are the inequalities mainly between 
urban and rural areas, or do they loom large within the rural sector? 
 
18. Some studies – not least, by D.L. Sheth -- have argued that a new middle class has 
emerged in India that includes many rural dwellers and many people from the 
lower strata in the old hierarchies.  This is partly the result of reservations, but 
perhaps also as a consequence of the decline in the influence of the old 
hierarchies.  Other commentators argue that the main impact of this trend is to 
alienate members of the middle class who come from the lower strata from their 
caste fellows who remain outside the middle class.   
 
19. The ideas in Gopal Guru’s recent study of Maharashtra will surely give us other 
things to consider.  It will be interesting to see if, like Dalits (and non-Dalits) 
interviewed by Devesh Kapur and colleagues in UP (in the EPW, 28 August 2010, 
pp. 39-49), he has have found “massive changes” and an acceleration of the pace 
of change, so that “the world has been turned upside down”.  Kapur et al. also 
found that the acquisition of status has now become possible through changes in 
consumption patterns offering a “new freedom…that has been historically 
unattainable”.  They report that changes in wealth alone cannot “explain the 
magnitude of the changes in social practice”.  They also argue that “an increase in 
access to status, even from consumption goods, is an expansion in freedoms”.     
 
     These and other issues have not been adequately discussed.  We will have a very 
formidable group of analysts at the Shimla conference -- and fortunately, they will 
express diverse views.  This should enable us to refine and elaborate our ideas.  
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